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As We Fleece Our Debtors
Karen Gross*
I. Introduction
The extraordinary level of controversy surrounding the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission's, (the "Commission")
consumer bankruptcy recommendations' tells us something very
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. This article is the text of a presentation
at the Dickinson Law Review Symposium titled "The National Bankruptcy Review
Commission Report: A Commentary on Proposed Change." The author would like to thank
Thomas Bauer, NYLS 1998, for his able research assistance. Since the date of the
presentation, there have been certain developments in the field of post-discharge agreements.
To update readers, these are presented in the post-script to this article. See infra pp. 757-60.
1. The Consumer Recommendations appear in Chapter One of the Commission's Final
Report issued on October 20, 1997. See BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, 1997 FINAL REPORT,
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 77-302 (1997). There was a lack of consensus among the
Commission membership, as evidenced by the overtly vituperative dissents issued by several
of the Commissioners, most particularly the Honorable Edith Hollan Jones and Com-
missioner James Shepard. See BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, 1997 FINAL REPORT, RECOMMEN-
DATIONS FOR REFORM OF CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW BY FOUR DISSENTING COMMIS-
SIONERS 1043-1117; BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, 1997 FINAL REPORT, ADDITIONAL DISSENT
TO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM OF CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW 1123-96; BANKR.
REVIEW COMM'N, 1997 FINAL REPORT, DISSENT FROM THE PROCESS OF WRITING THE
COMMISSION'S REPORT 1309-11. Evidence of the controversy is demonstrated by the high
level of legislative activity, first in anticipation of the Commission's Final Report in the form
of a bill introduced by Representatives McCollum and Boucher on September 18, 1997. See
H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. (1997); 143 CONG. REC. S10899 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1997) (statements
of Senators Grassley and Durbin). Furthermore, Representative Gekas, and three other
representatives including Representative McCollum, introduced the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1998 on February 3, 1998. See H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. (1998) [hereinafter Gekas bill].
On the same date, Representative Nadler introduced a bill titled "The Consumer Lenders
and Borrowers Bankruptcy Accountability Act of 1998." See H.R. 3146, 105th Cong. (1998)
[hereinafter Nadler bill]. Commentary on the Commission Report, the McCollum and
Grassley bills, and now the Gekas and Nadler bills has generated a plethora of media
attention. See, e.g., Dueling Bankruptcy Measures Set Stage for House Fight, NAT'L J.'S
CONG. DAILY, Feb. 3, 1998; Lawrence Chimerine, Bankruptcy Reform: Worse Than Nothing,
BANKING STRATEGIES, Jan./Feb. 1998; Melanie McManus, Bankruptcy Reform-Not, UMI,
INC., Jan. 1998, at 42; Consumer Group Comes Out Against H.R. 2500, CONSUMER BANKR.
NEWS, Jan. 29, 1998; Take It Personally, CNNFN, Jan. 16, 1998 (Transcript No. 97011602FN-
108); CU's Lobby for Tougher Bankruptcy Bill, AM. BANKER-BOND BUYER, Jan. 12, 1998,
at 1; House Panel's Consumer Views Split on Party Lines, CONSUMER BANKR. NEWS, Dec.
18, 1997.
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important: consumer bankruptcy is big business, the economic
stakes are high, the solutions will be hard fought, and the prospects
for consensus are dubious. Reasonable people certainly can, and
will, differ on and debate about how our legal system should treat
individuals whose failure manifests itself in economic terms.2
Undeterred by the controversy, in these brief remarks, I would
like to focus on an area of consumer bankruptcy that has not
received a great deal of attention: post-discharge "reaffirmation"
agreements. Alerting readers to this area of consumer law
accomplishes two goals: first, it highlights the importance of
legislative reform on this issue; and second, it focuses us on the
(and one would hope non-controversial) need for post-filing debtor
education. The Commission's Final Report addressed post-filing
"reaffirmation" agreements; however, as more fully described,3 the
Commission's recommendations do not go far enough in protecting
debtors post-discharge. And, while the Commission's Final Report
thankfully endorses financial education, a link does not exist
between such education and post-filing reaffirmation agreements.
Linking these two seemingly disparate topics reinforces the
significance of reform with respect to both issues.
II. Post-Discharge "Reaffirmation" Agreements
The Commission's Final Report makes a series of recommen-
dations4 regarding reaffirmation agreements.' Concerned about,
2. An example of this debate is highlighted in the most recent issue of the American
Bankruptcy Law Journal where Judge Robert D. Martin and Professors Kenneth N. Klee,
Lynn M. LoPucki, and Elizabeth Warren proffer suggestions for how to treat consumer
debtors. See Elizabeth Warren, A Principled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 483 (1997); Lynn M. LoPucki, Common Sense Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 461 (1997); Robert D. Martin, A Riposte to Klee, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 453
(1997); Kenneth N. Klee, Restructuring Individual Debts, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431 (1997).
I, too, have entered that debate, most recently in my book. See KAREN GROSS, FAILURE
AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSYTEM (1997). What is important
to me is that debate be "on the merits," recognizing the legitimate differences in perspective
that can be brought to bear. What troubles me is that the debate regularly plunges into the
gutter, leading to ad hominem attacks that not only have no place in the world of intellectual
exchange but are unproductive. Specific examples available upon request.
3. See discussion infra notes 6-30.
4. Originally, the majority of the Commissioners had adopted an approach less
favorable to reaffirmation agreements. However, a compromise was ultimately reached on
August 12, 1997 based on recommendations of Commissioner Caldwell Butler.
5. See BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, 1997 FINAL REPORT, RECOMMENDATIONS TO CON-
GRESS 145-74 [hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS]. The term "reaffirmation
agreement" does not actually appear in the Bankruptcy Code itself. See 11 U.S.C. § 524
[Vol. 102:4
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among other things, the number of debtors reaffirming unsecured
debts, the Commission recommended eliminating unsecured
reaffirmation agreements and certain secured reaffirmation
agreements where the value of the collateral was less than five
hundred dollars.6 The Commission also recommended a strength-
ening of the procedural hurdles that needed to be satisfied if a
reaffirmation agreement were to be permitted.7 Clearly, the
concern about reaffirmation agreements was heightened by the very
public debacle involving Sears Roebuck, and the revelation that
Sears had obtained numerous reaffirmations that were never filed
with the bankruptcy court, in direct contravention of the provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code.8 Whether or not the Commission has
drawn the line in the proper place for improving the reaffirmation
process,9 this area unquestionably needs reform; indeed, we are
only now beginning to uncover both the magnitude of pre-discharge
reaffirmation, formal and informal," and the improper conduct of
creditors with respect to such reaffirmation."
What has received remarkably little attention is Commission
Recommendation 1.3.2, which states that section 524 should be
amended to include an added subsection:
... to provide that the court shall grant a judgment
in favor of an individual who has received a dis-
charge ... for costs and attorneys fee, plus treble
damages, from a creditor who threatens, files suit, or
(1994). However, the term is used in the legislative history and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 4008. It is also a term that appears commonly in cases, everyday bankruptcy
practice, and treatises.
6. See RECOMMENDATION TO CONGRESS, supra note 5, at 145-74.
7. See id. More specifically, Recommendation 1.31 sets out the details of what must
be in the motion for approval (such as the underlying contract documents, security
agreements, and evidence of perfection). That recommendation also sets out the details of
when a hearing is (and is not) required.
8. The Sears story is detailed in In re Latanowich, 207 B.R. 326 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1997). Press coverage was extensive, but, for the most detailed account, see Barnaby J.
Feder, The Harder Side of Sears, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1997, at Cl.
9. With some minor variations, I am in favor of the Commission approach.
10. Regrettably, data are not compiled on the number of reaffirmation agreements
either filed with the court or approved pursuant to a hearing. See Karen Gross, Perceptions
and Misperceptions of Reaffirmation Agreements, 102 COMM. L.J. 339, 346-49 (1998).
Clearly, reaffirmations as to which there is neither a hearing nor a filing fall off the data
radar screen. The paucity of bankruptcy data, and the richness of what we could learn if we
had them, are a story for another day. See id. at 360-73.
11. See id. (detailing the empirical work of Professors Culhane and White and noting
the growing list of alleged wrongdoers).
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otherwise seeks to collect any debt that was dis-
charged in bankruptcy and was not the subject of an
agreement in accordance with subsections (c) and (d)
of section 524.12
In support of this provision, the Commission Report details the
number of unfiled reaffirmation agreements and the very active
efforts of creditors to collect from debtors
13 post-discharge.1 4
The Commission Report goes on to state that nothing in this
recommendation prevents "a debtor from making voluntary
repayments on a discharged debt,' '15 a statement that is fully
consistent with the wording of section 524(f). 6 The Commission
Recommendation also serves two key functions: it creates a remedy
for non-compliance with the discharge injunction; 17 and, at least
12. RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS, supra note 5, at 161-62 (emphasis added).
13. There is an important issue of terminology here. Is an individual whose debts have
been discharged in bankruptcy still a debtor? A related issue arose in Perovich v.
Humphrey, No. 97C3209, 1997 WL 674975 (N.D. IlI. Oct. 28, 1997), where the court
questioned whether a discharged debt was a "debt" within the meaning of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act and determined that it was. See id. at *1. I use the terms "debtor"
and "former debtor" interchangeably in referring to individuals whose bankruptcy case is
closed and their debts discharged. On a related note, is an entity that acquires a creditor's
claim a "creditor?"
14. William Mapother provides various sample letters creditors can send to debtors. He
also has a sample form that he recommends creditors prepare for the debtor that the debtor,
in turn, is supposed to send to the creditor. Titled "Informal Repayment Statement," the
form, which has been adopted by several creditors based on my own review of correspon-
dence received by debtors, is an effort to circumvent the strictures of section 524(a)(2), (c),
and (d) and fit within the parameters of section 524(f). The letter provides, in relevant part:
Because I want to maintain my good credit standing with you, I wish to voluntarily
repay your debt which I included in my bankruptcy .... Because I may
occasionally forget to make a payment, I want you to send me a reminder if and
when I miss a payment. I want you to do this as a service to me, and I am aware
that you would not be doing this without my requesting it.
WILLIAM MAPOTHER, WINNING BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES FOR CONSUMER CREDITORS 210
(1989).
15. Id. at 165.
16. Section 524(f) was added as part of the 1984 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code.
In a sense, the provision was intended to counterbalance the stringent requirements
regarding reaffirmations that also were added in 1984. The absence of a provision relating
to voluntary repayment does not suggest, I believe, that such payments were prohibited
under the Code or its predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act. Rather, it is to clarify what is
permissible in view of the added standards for reaffirmation. However, even without an
express provision, repayments still had to be voluntary. See In re Lillie, 12 B.R. 860, 862
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981).
17. At present, the Code is silent on a remedy for a violation of the discharge
injunction.
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arguably, it accords debtors a private right of action for a section
524(a)(2) violation."8
Although alluded to in the footnotes to this Recommenda-
tion,19 the discussion in the Commission's Final Report fails to
address one of the rapidly growing aspects of consumer bankruptcy:
the buying and selling of consumer debts. 2° Although those
familiar with Chapter 11 have been dealing for some time with the
buying and selling of claims and the problems associated with such
practice, 1 little attention has been paid to how that issue plays out
in the consumer arena.22 Indeed, until recently, many people were
unaware that acquisition of consumer debt, such as charged-off
debt, Chapter 13 debt, and discharged debt, was lucrative.23
I am most concerned, in this context, with the purchase and
sale of discharged debt for pennies on the dollar. Why would
someone seek to acquire discharged debt, particularly in view of
the section 524(a)(2) injunction? One possibility is that this
acquisition is an inexpensive way to acquire a mailing list.
Furthermore, what does the acquirer intend to do with this mailing
list? On the surface, obtaining mailing lists is a perfectly acceptable
thing; it happens every day. One, however, should think about why
one would want a list of discharged debtors. Certainly, if the
acquirer can get a former debtor to repay even pennies on the
dollar of the discharged debt, the acquisition becomes profitable.
Moreover, if the acquirer can get the former debtor to enter into
18. The court in Perovich questioned whether such a right exists, though noting cases
where damages were awarded. See Perovich, 1997 WL 674975, at *4.
19. See MATHOPER, supra note 14, at 164 nn.362-63.
20. See Gross, supra note 10, at 349-51.
21. See Frederick Tung, Confirmation and Claims Trading, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1684
(1996); W. Andrew Logan III, Claims Trading: The Need for Further Amending Federal Rule
of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(e)(2), 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 495 (1994); Chaim J.
Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Developments in Trading Claims: Participations and
Disputed Claims, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 733 (1993); Joy Flowers Conti et al., Claims
Trafficking in Chapter 11-Has the Pendulum Swung Too Far?, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 281
(1992).
22. I question whether we should treat and protect claim transferees in the same manner
as original creditors. See GROSS, supra note 2, at 184-90. Certainly, when the Code was
drafted and creditor protections inserted, thought was not given to the possibility (now
reality) that numerous original creditors would no longer be in the picture. Sophisticated
investors have replaced the unsecured creditor with tennis shoes from Kansas. Whether the
purchase and sale of consumer debts should alter the balance between debtors and creditors
rights in the consumer context remains a troubling and open issue for me.
23. There are whole conferences dedicated to this issue. For a relevant website (and
sponsor of programs), see http://www.debtormarketplace.com.
1998]
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a new credit relationship or to purchase a new item, the acquisition
makes even more economic sense.
Two recent examples are instructive. In a class action
captioned Kim v. Fayazi,24 an entity known as Amcredit solicited
an individual who had been a debtor. That solicitation indicates
that Amcredit acquired the individual's discharged debt from
Chemical Bank. If the debtor were willing to repay the discharged
debt voluntarily, Amcredit would give the individual a new Visa
credit card with a limit of 110% of what was repaid. 5 Stated
more simply, the former debtor was agreeing to repay discharged
debt to garner a new credit card. Although the documents are not
abundantly clear on this point, it does appear as if Amcredit would
charge interest on both the newly used credit, from the Visa card,
and the previously discharged debt. Additionally, payments for
both debts were to be automatically deducted from the debtor's
bank account.26
In Perovich,27 an entity known as National Legal Recovery
Service sought to recover allegedly secured merchandise from a
discharged debtor. Apparently, the debtor had discharged
unsecured debts, but, according to the court, the "security interest
in the bed appears to have survived."'  The original creditor,
Craftmatic Adjustable Bed, had sold its interest to National Legal
Recovery Service. Although the district court opinion is focused
largely on procedural issues, albeit interesting ones like whether the
district court or the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction of a section
524 action when the bankruptcy case is closed and whether a
24. This case is pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, Case No. 96 C 6966, before Judge Williams and Magistrate Judge
Guzman. According to counsel for Bestbank, the case is presently in the discovery stage.
The docket sheet on file with author.
25. The solicitation material indicated that after six months of payments, the credit can
increase to 150% of the repayment amount. However, this added "benefit" is only available
to individuals who agreed to the "automatic payment program." That program permits the
claims acquirer to make automatic deductions from the former debtor's bank account.
26. The transaction documents are on file with author. The Second Amended
Complaint makes this assertion in paragraphs 42, 55, 56, and 63.
27. This case also is pending in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois before Judge Zagel. See Perovich v. Humphrey, No. 97C3209, 1997 WL
674975 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 1997). A motion to reconsider part of the October 28th decision
was denied and the rejection of the certification of the class was affirmed. The plaintiffs in
Kim and Perovich are represented by Daniel A. Edelman of Edelman & Combs in Chicago,
Illinois.
28. Id. at *1.
[Vol. 102:4
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private right of action exists under section 524, the substantive
issues surface. The question remains whether a debtor can be
pursued post-petition by a claim transferee.29
III. Statutory Gaps
Two points can be made immediately. First, whatever
agreement a debtor enters into with a claims acquirer, it is not a
reaffirmation agreement. Section 524(c)(1) specifically provides
that its coverage is for agreements "made before the granting of a
discharge." Despite the clarity of this language, a number of courts
have treated post-discharge agreements as if they were reaffirma-
tion agreements, either ignoring or glossing over the post-discharge
nature of the arrangement.3" The Commission's Final Report
specifically notes that the new subsection relates to agreements not
covered by sections 524(c) or (d).
Second, if post-discharge agreements are not reaffirmation
agreements, then the procedural safeguards established by section
524(c) and (d) are inapplicable. These agreements can arise "off
the radar screen" in the sense that they are not subject to court
approval, they do not need to be filed with the bankruptcy court,
and the debtor is frequently not represented by counsel post-
discharge.3 So, what we have is a type of interaction between
former debtors and claims acquirers that is bounded by non-
bankruptcy law32 and whatever protection the discharge injunction
in section 524(a)(2) provides. Additionally, there is the omnipres-
ent issue of section 524(f). There is, then, a gap.
Claims acquirers clearly find comfort supporting their contact
with former debtors in section 524(f) which, as noted earlier,
permits a debtor to repay voluntarily discharged debt. So, the
29. I assume the debtor was not in default on payments of the secured portion of the
debt. Moreover, although I have not seen the complaint, perhaps National Recovery
Services thought it could induce payments from the debtor by suggesting its power to
repossess the collateral.
30. See, e.g., Arnold v. Stevenson Fed. Credit Union, 206 B.R. 560 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1997). In that case, as well as others, the court fails to distinguish between post-filing and
post-discharge.
31. In a way, this raises a problem similar to that of informal reaffirmation agreements
or the non-filed agreements. These are activities that fall off the radar screen, and, hence,
no court is in a position to know about or consider such activities.
32. Possible federal and state laws violated include the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1994), the Truth in Lending Act, see id. §§ 1601-1677, the state
version of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, and RICO.
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argument goes, the discharge injunction is not violated if the debtor
voluntarily repays the discharged debt. The question then
inevitably hinges on the definition of "voluntary repayment." Not
surprisingly, the issue is not made clear in the Code or the
accompanying legislative history. But, to my surprise, there are
remarkably few cases addressing the meaning of voluntariness for
purposes of section 524(f),33 and those that exist are not consistent
each with the other.34
Several examples suffice. In Van Meter v. American State
Bank,35 a bank sought to require a debtor to repay his discharged
33. For a sampling, see In re Arnold, 206 B.R. 560, 566 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1997); In re
Smurzynski, 72 B.R. 368, 370 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987).
34. There is clearly a wealth of literature discussing the meaning of voluntariness in non-
bankruptcy contexts, such as criminal law, which would enrich the analysis. See, e.g., Welsh
S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy
Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105 (1997) (arguing that due process mandates the
prohibition of interrogation techniques that likely lead to false confessions); Richard A. Leo,
Criminal Law: The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621 (1996)
(summarizing and analyzing the impact of Miranda on police interrogation methods); John
R. Silber, Being and Doing: A Study of Status Responsibility and Voluntary Responsibility,
35 U. CHI. L. REV. 47 (1967) (discussing the relationship between legal responsibility for
criminal conduct and moral philosophy). As expressed in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (quoting Paul M. Bator & James Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention,
Interrogation and the Right to Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66
COLUM. L. REV. 62, 72-73 (1966)),
Except where a person is unconscious ... , all incriminating statements-even
those made under brutal treatment-are "voluntary" in the sense of representing
a choice of alternatives. On the other hand, if "voluntariness" incorporates
notions of "but for" cause, the question should be whether the statement would
have been made even absent inquiry or other official action. Under such a test,
virtually no statement would be voluntary .... It is thus evident that neither
linguistics nor epistemology will provide a ready definition of the meaning of
"voluntariness."
Id. This is not, by the way, a suggestion that the bankruptcy law involves criminal conduct,
and hence we should look to criminal law by way of analogy.
While not within the purview of this paper, application of some of the non-bankruptcy
caselaw and literature on voluntariness to the bankruptcy debate surrounding section 524(f)
would be instructive. For an example of applying other non-bankruptcy literature to the
bankruptcy context, see GROSS, supra note 2, at 142-44 (applying constitutional law analysis
of the meaning of equality); Susan Block-Lieb, Congress' Temptation to Defect: A Political
and Economic Theory of Legislative Change to Financial Common Pool Problems, 39 ARIZ.
L. REV. 801 (1997) (applying game theory and public choice theory to our understanding of
bankruptcy); Lynn M. LoPucki & George G. Triantis, A Systems Approach to Comparing
United States and Canadian Reorganization of Financially Distressed Companies, 35 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 267 (1994) (applying systems analysis to bankruptcy data collection efforts).
35. 89 B.R. 32 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988).
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debt from several years back16 as a precondition to obtaining a
new mortgage. The court eloquently distinguishes between
"spontaneous" voluntariness37 and "exogenous" voluntariness, 38
the latter being murkier. The court concludes that Congress
intended to preclude all creditor initiated post-discharge agree-
ments.39 Other courts are less concerned with spontaneous
voluntariness; these courts focus instead on creditor behavior.4"
Interestingly, the Court in Van Meter includes what turns out
to be a prescient footnote for our purposes; it states:
It is, of course, theoretically possible that a repay-
ment might be due to duress on the part of someone
other than the creditor not acting as an agent of
the creditor.[41 ]  Probably such repayments would
not be voluntary within the meaning of § 524(f), and
the problem of third party duress is not presented in
this case and this is best left to another day.
42
A claim transferee, such as Amcredit or National Recovery
Services, would be just such a third party. What this footnote
suggests is that we need to look closely at the wording of section
524(a)(2), (f), and any new subsection that might be added to
insure that the discharge injunction extends to third parties and
that a true voluntary payment could be made to a third party as
well as a creditor.43
In In re Bowling,44 the court highlighted a central feature of
voluntariness: for something to be voluntary, the debtor could not
be obligated to repay either in actuality or belief. Thus, if a debtor
sought a new loan and a creditor agreed to provide the same if the
debtor entered into a promissory note to repay discharged debt, the
36. Although not addressed directly, section 524(f) was not in effect when the debtor
sought bankruptcy relief and obtained his discharge of the bank debt.
37. See Van Meter, 89 B.R. at 34.
38. See id.
39. See id. I am not sure this is the correct viewpoint. Is it possible that a debtor might
agree to a creditor initiated request and be doing so voluntarily? It seems excessively
paternalistic/maternalistic to assume that a debtor could never act voluntarily unless he/she
is the mover in the transaction.
40. See, e.g., In re Arnold, 206 B.R. 560, 567 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1997).
41. This would be, to my mind, the claim acquirer.
42. See Van Meter, 89 B.R. at 34 n.3.
43. This assumes that there is no support for an outright ban of all post-discharge
repayment to a non-creditor party, whether voluntary in a spontaneous or exogenous
manner.
44. 116 B.R. 659, 664 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1990).
1998]
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repayment was not voluntary. The result would be the same
regardless of whether it was the debtor or the creditor who
suggested linking the new and the discharged debt.45  Bowling,
like Van Meter, involved the original creditor, not a claim trans-
feree.
Hudson v. Central Bank46 is a case involving a debtor who
erroneously47 made repeated payments to his creditor bank post-
petition.' The bank never informed that debtor that he did not
need to make payment; indeed, the debtor had been in Saudi
Arabia during his actual bankruptcy case so he was uninformed as
to his options. While the creditor bank in Hudson did not actually
seek to collect, it did permit the debtor to live under the illusion
that payment was required. Stated differently, the creditor had no
duty to inform the debtor that he was not obligated to repay
despite the fact that the debtor asked direct questions regarding his
repayments. This decision troubles me.49  In contract law, we
consider a contract voidable on the basis of misrepresentation if a
party failed to disclose a material fact when asked." Also, the sin
of omission can be as grave as the sin of commission.5 This is not
to say that a creditor must volunteer to teach debtors their rights.
However, if debtors ask why a creditor is keeping their money
post-discharge, it is not acceptable or clever for a creditor to "play
cute."
45. Regrettably, the court treated the post-discharge agreement as a "reaffirmation
agreement" even though it was entered post-discharge. See id. at 663. Moreover, the court
observed that the post-discharge agreement would need to comply with section 524(c) and
(d). See id. at 664.
46. 168 B.R. 368 (Bankr. S.D. IlI. 1994).
47. In the court's mind, repeated mistaken payments did not obligate the debtor to keep
making payments. See id. at 371 n.1.
48. The case expressly rejects the "spontaneous" test of voluntariness adopted in Van
Meter. See id. at 371.
49. The Commission's Report could be read to support the Hudson decision when it
states, "Creditors are free to keep payments that the debtor willingly remits." BANKR.
REVIEW COMM'N, 1997 FINAL REPORT 165 (1997). Maybe one could argue that the debtor
payments in Hudson were not willingly remitted. I would prefer that the debate on the topic
be closed altogether.
50. See Kannavos v. Annino, 247 N.E.2d 708, 711 (Mass. 1969).
51. See Holcomb v. Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507,511-12 (N.D. 1985); Weintraub v. Krobatsch,
317 A.2d 68, 74 (N.J. 1974).
[Vol. 102:4
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IV. Commission Recommendation and Other Alternatives
Unfortunately, the Commission Recommendation 1.3.2 misses
the opportunity to address certain specific issues raised by the new
industry of buying and selling consumer debt. Stated differently,
the Commission Recommendation is fine as far as it goes by
serving three functions: it recognizes the problems of creditors
seeking to collect post-discharge; it provides a remedy for non-
compliance with the discharge injunction; and it seemingly creates
a private right of action.52 However, Commission Recommenda-
tion 1.3.2 does not go far enough to protect the debtor.
5 3
First, the Commission preserves section 524(f) which permits
debtors to repay if they choose to do so voluntarily, but it does not
clarify the meaning of this subsection, most particularly the
meaning of "voluntariness. '
Second, the Commission Recommendation uses terminology
that leaves key issues open to debate. It specifically speaks of
"creditor" action. While a claims acquirer may be a "creditor"
within the meaning of section 101(10), the debt in question has
been discharged. Thus, at least arguably, the "claim" did not arise
at the time of or before the entry of the order for relief. The term
"creditor" is, then, too narrow. Additionally, the Recommendation
speaks to "debts," a particularly problematic term in the post-
discharge context.
Third, Commission Recommendation 1.3.2 limits its scope to
creditors who "seek to collect." Curtailing this particular creditor
behavior leaves many other offending behavior outside the scope
of the Recommendation, and it leads us back, yet again, to a
discussion of the meaning of "voluntariness." For example, the
creditor conduct in Hudson would not fall within the Commission's
52. The Nadler bill, supra note 1, in section 4, subpart a, creates sanctions for "creditor
abuses." Included is a remedy for a violation of the discharge injunction. See id. § 4(a)(3).
It also seems to include a provision that would expressly prohibit the conduct of the claims
transferee in Perovich. See id. § 4(c)(4).
53. Regrettably, the plethora of bankruptcy bills introduced in the 105th Congress, see
supra note 1, suffer from a similar infirmity. Somehow, the state of the industry has
outpaced the drafters.
54. The examples in the text of the Commission's Final Report of voluntary repayment
are narrow. See BANKR. REvtEw COMM'N, 1997 FINAL REPORT 165. However, there is
nothing in the Code itself to reinforce this narrow interpretation.
55. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. See also Perovich v. Humphrey, No.
97C3209, 1997 WL 674975 (N.D. I11. Oct. 28, 1997).
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proffered language since the creditor was silent and arguably did
not "seek to collect. 5 6 Claim acquirers who offer new credit in
exchange for debt repayment are arguably not "seeking to collect;"
they are seeking to give. Thus, the language needs to be expanded
to control behavior not within the ambit of "seeking to collect."
It is certainly easier to criticize language limitations than to
make suggestions of one's own. I remain troubled by the vagaries
of section 524(f); while I am not in favor necessarily of defining
"voluntariness," I think we need a better understanding regarding
what is meant by this section. Clearly, what constitutes a voluntary
payment for a discharged debtor should not hinge on where one
happens to reside. Moreover, I am troubled by discharged debtors
acting when they do not know or understand their rights. Certain-
ly, we could give former debtors a cooling off period before a post-
discharge agreement became enforceable, as done in other areas of
consumer law. Or, we could require that the creditor or claims
acquirer inform the former debtor of his/her rights in a writing that
would need to be signed by the debtor, rights such as the right not
to make repayment. Whether, as an empirical matter, added
disclosure and signing actually assists debtors is an open issue for
me. Furthermore, we could make explicit that the bankruptcy
court retains jurisdiction for purposes of enforcing the discharge
injunction.57
I am struck, however, by a systematic and systemic change that
would improve this area, as well as others-post-filing consumer
debtor education. As the Commission recognized in Commission
Recommendation 1.1.5, part of the dilemma for post-filing debtors
is that they emerge from the bankruptcy system no better able to
re-enter the credit marketplace. They emerge with few, if any, of
the financial management skills necessary to avoid economic
distress in the future. A very real and urgent need exists to
educate debtors about their rights and responsibilities.58 The
56. In re Hudson, 168 B.R. 368, 370-71 (Bankr. S.D. I11. 1994).
57. The Commission Recommendation quite correctly provides for sanctions for non-
compliance which should create an incentive for compliance.
58. The Coalition for Consumer Bankruptcy Debtor Education, a not-for-profit
organization composed of a group of individuals representing diverse constituencies, was
recently formed. The Coalition's initial Board of Directors is composed of debtor
representatives, creditor representatives, judges, government officials, legal and non-legal
educators, credit reporting representatives, psychologists, trustees, and credit counseling
services. The Coalition is dedicated to the development of widely available, cost-effective
post-filing education programs for the over one million individual debtors seeking bankruptcy
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frequency with which debtors enter into reaffirmation agreements
during their cases and respond positively to post-discharge
collections efforts, whether by creditors or claims acquirers, are but
two indicators that debtors do not truly understand their rights.
Therefore, if we are truly to provide debtors with a fresh start,
we need to give them more than a legal discharge of their obliga-
tions; we need to give them the tools to be knowledgeable
participants in our market-based economy and to provide them
with education. This is not a new idea,59 and it should not be a
controversial one.6  While we can certainly differ over course
content, pedagogy, teachers, costs, and testing, we should be able
to agree that quality education for debtors, wherever they reside,
is a good thing. And, we should be able to agree that such
programs cannot be developed on an ad hoc basis; they need to be
carefully planned and developed in some organized and systematic
way. So, while it is unrealistic to assume that partisanship will fall
by the wayside on most of the consumer issues, perhaps we can
achieve agreement on this: debtor education makes sense; it will
improve the lives of debtors, and it will benefit present and future
creditors and society. Agreement on that issue would not be a bad
beginning.
V. Postscript
Since February of 1998 (when this presentation was made), the
number of published decisions in the post-discharge arena has
grown.61 These cases all wrestle with the issues developed in this
piece and should serve to remind readers that the topic is not only
alive and well but growing.
relief. The Coalition's first set is to develop and test a pilot program. Information about the
Coalition is available from the author.
59. See Karen Gross, Introducing a Debtor Education Program into the U.S. Bankruptcy
System: A Roadmap for Change, submitted to the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
on July 7, 1997 and appearing in the Appendix to the Commission Report.
60. See Gekas bill, supra note 1, § 112 (containing a provision for debtor education,
including a pilot project).
61. See In re Wiley, 224 B.R. 58 (N.D. II. 1998); In re Armstead, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS
2166 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.); In re Brown, 220 B.R. 101 (Bankr. C.D. Ca. 1998); In re Smith, 224
B.R. 388 (Bankr. N.D. II. 1998); In re Stevens, 217 B.R. 757 (Bankr. D. Md. 1998); In re
Bryer, 216 B.R. 755 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998). Consistent with the observations in this paper,
there have also been numerous decisions dealing with reaffirmation agreements (in the pre-




The best discussion of the multiple meanings of voluntariness
can be found in In re Armstead.6 2 Noting that courts should look
to exogenous voluntariness, Judge Diane Weiss Sigmund deter-
mined that the creditor's efforts to get the debtor to repay
obligations for furniture and carpet violated Section 524(f). 63 An
interesting and troubling twist on the issue of voluntariness is found
in the District Court opinion in In re Wiley' where the court
found that a debtor's payments were voluntary based on imputing
to the debtor knowledge in the hands of the debtor's lawyer. Since
the debtor's lawyer knew the reaffirmation agreement had never
been filed (indeed, it was intentionally kept by the lawyer in her
own fies for a significant period), her client had to know that
payments under that non-fied agreement were not required; hence,
if payments were being made to the creditor, they were volun-
tary.65 There were at least two decisions involving third party
creditors-In re Armstead66 and In re Brown.6 7  In Browns the
Court lashed out at the claims acquirer for wilfully violating the
discharge injunction and awarded sanctions (albeit small). What
apparently so angered the judge was that the claims acquirer had
tried, unsuccessfully, to get the debtor to reaffirm the debt; when
the debtor refused to do so, the claim transferee did not give up
and continued to pursue the debtor post-discharge. Two of the
new cases, In re Smith69 and In re Stevens,70 specifically address
what quantum of new consideration is needed to make a post-
discharge agreement permissible and not an improper "reaffirma-
tion" agreement. Both cases make it clear that the "new consider-
ation" argument cannot be a way of circumventing the require-
ments of Section 524(c) and (d); accordingly, the effort to refinance
is simply not enough-even when the lender dismissed a foreclo-
sure action and elected not to pursue a personal deficiency against
a non-filing spouse.
62. 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2166 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997).
63. Id. A less debtor friendly approach was taken in In re Bryer, 216 B.R. 755 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1998) where Judge Scholl found voluntariness.
64. 224 B.R. 58 (N.D. I1. 1998).
65. The case also contains a useful discussion of class certification.
66. 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2166 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.).
67. 220 B.R. 101 (Bankr. C.D. Ca. 1998).
68. Supra note 7.
69. 224 B.R. 388 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1998).
70. 217 B.R. 757 (Bankr. N.D. Md. 1998).
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While these new cases have been developing, there has not
been silence on the legislative front. Although major bankruptcy
legislation71 did not make it through the just ended 105th session
of Congress, it is clear that bankruptcy reform will be back on the
Congressional agenda, perhaps as early as January 1999.72 And,
if the wording of the final incarnation of the legislation is any
indicator of what is to come,73 we should be very worried about
how issues of post-discharge agreements and debtor education will
be treated.
The proposed legislation did not specifically address the post-
discharge issues involving claims acquirers. However, the legisla-
tion did create a private right of action for violations by creditors
of the discharge injunction;74 that is a significant improvement and
would avoid the repeated litigation over whether a private cause of
action exists. However, what the legislation gave with one hand,
it took away with another. The legislation did away with all class
actions for discharge violations, a proposal that would effectively
eliminate one of the most powerful weapons in the consumer
debtors' arsenal.75 Indeed, this provision is so stunning in its pro-
creditor orientation that one cannot help but wonder how it found
its way into the legislation when it appeared in neither the House
nor Senate bills76 that served as the precursors of the House-
Senate conference legislation.
Debtor education was treated in two places in the House-
Senate conference legislation.77 First, there is a reference to pilot
education program to be conducted in three regions of the country
71. Several changes to the Bankruptcy Code have been signed into law over the past
several months. See, e.g., Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropri-
ations Act (HR 4328-P.L. 105-277), which provides for a six month extension of Chapter 12,
retroactive to October 1, 1998; Higher Education Amendments of 1998 (HR 6-P.L. 105-244)
which amends section 523(a)(8) to make student loans non-dischargeable except for undue
hardship, effective October 7, 1998; Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection
Act of 1997 (S. 1244-P.L. 105-183) which enables a debtor to contribute a prescribed percent-
age of income to charitable organizations without said donations being challenged as
fraudulent transfers, effective June 19, 1998.
72. See, e.g., Dawn Kopecki, "Legislation to Reform Bankruptcy Laws Goes Belly-Up
in Senate, " WASHINGTON TIMES, Oct. 15, 1998, Sec. B, p. 8; "Attempt to Revive Bankruptcy
Bill Fails," L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1998, p.4 .
73. See Conf. Report H. Rept. 105-794.
74. Section 1160)(1) of H. Rept. 105-794.
75. Section 1160)(2) of H. Rept. 105-794.
76. See H.R. 3150 and S.1301.
77. Sections 104 and 302 of H. Rept. 105-794.
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and then evaluated.78 This provision is virtually identical to the
proposal for debtor education in H.R. 3150. While I have minor
knit-picks with this proposal, mostly related to proposed timetables,
the suggestion is a very good step in the right direction. However,
as in the prior example, the pilot program's strength is undermined
by a proposal for a mandatory debtor education program that
would commence-without preparation, study or fund-
ing-immediately upon enactment of the legislation.79  The
proposed legislation specifically links completion of an education
project to the bankruptcy discharge in Chapter 7 and 13; unless a
financial management course were completed, a debtor could not
obtain a bankruptcy discharge. This legislation is evidence of how
a very good idea can go very wrong. It is simply premature to
institute a mandatory nationwide debtor education program.
Canada, which has a mandatory debtor education program,
conducted an initial pilot study and even with that, there was a
sense that the program moved from study to implementation too
quickly. As drafted, the legislation is an invitation for education
profiteers; there would be no opportunity to evaluate quality to
insure that all debtors, wherever they live, are provided with similar
financial management skills.
Taken as a whole, the proposed legislation is yet another
example of how to fleece our debtors. That is not a comforting
thought.
78. Section 104 of H. Rept. 105-794.
79. Section 302 of H. Rept. 105-794.
[Vol. 102:4
